The trade diversion effect will be specially important where there are structural or natural limitations on overall supply of export goods, e.g. in the case of energy or other natural resources. Trade diversion, by reducing incomes of countries outside, can then lead to trade reduction or trade destruction. This danger is strongly reinforced if WHFTA provides incentives (or excuses) for Asian and European countries, and their regional groupings, to adopt restrictive trade and investment policies.
This illustrates the importance of keeping WHFTA GATT-compatible, and making the negotiations transparent to trading countries outside the WHFTA.
(c) Pros and Cons for Latin America
From the point of view of LAC countries, the relationship between WHFTA and the Uruguay Round, is ambivalent. Multilateral trade liberalization will dilute the benefits of WHFTA for LAC (and also for North American exporters to Latin America). On the other hand, multilateral liberalization will help LAC exporters in third markets, and they will also benefit from a general trade expansion and rise in incomes. Here is another difficult "netting out" of pros and cons to be done, and the net result might well be different for different countries. However, there is no real problem for decision making since the success or failure of the Uruguay Round is more or less a datum for LAC countries, beyond their reach of influence. A scenario of no Uruguay Round/no WHFTA would be worse for Latin America than either Uruguay/no WHFTA or WHFTA/no Uruguay.
From the Latin American point of view, the chief attraction of WHFTA would be that it prevents the negative consequences of the marginalization which would result if the three big regional blocs in North America, Europe (including Eastern Europe and continued preferential treatment of Lx)me countries), and Japan (with the NlCs and coming NICs in East and South East Asia) should materialize and frustrate the process of global liberalization. This would be a very dangerous and unfavorable situation for Latin America (except perhaps for Mexico which, if NAFTA is ratified, will be included in the North American bloc). If such marginalization were to be combined with continued slow growth in the world economy, growing protectionism, continued debt pressure and unfavorable terms of trade, the outlook would be gloomy indeed. By contrast the WHFTA would appear in a good light, offering an escape from such a gloomy scenario. Even so it would still be a second best, with full multilateral global trade liberalization under GATT a first best -if that were a realistic alternative.
(2) DIFFICULTIES IN PREDICTING THE OUTCOME OF WHFTA (a) Calculating Dynamic Comparative Advantage
The problem of netting out the positive effects of trade creation and the negative effects of trade diversion is not the only reason why it is so difficult to be certain about the ultimate impact of WHFTA. One other reason relates to the fact that the trade creation based on existing static comparative advantages is only one part of the hoped-for benefits from a free trade area. The advocates of a FTA expect as much or more from the increase in efficiency of production and the development of new dynamic comparative advantages which trade creation is expected to bring in its wake, resulting from longer production runs, increased specialization, investment in specialized machinery etc and the associated benefits of transfer technology and increased investment under the enterprise America Initiative (EAI).
Such dynamic advantages are impossible to quantify numerically in any model and difficult to predict. (The same is of course also true of the dynamic disadvantages and vicious circles which might follow in the wake of the harmful effects of trade diversion or marginalisation.) Estimates of dynamic gains have been made in connection with NAFTA, but their applicability to WHITA is limited by the fact that the dynamic gains to Mexico arise partly from the displacement of other Latin American exports which would not apply under WHFTA. These dynamic comparative advantages are the most important for sustainable development. They are largely man-made rather than natural. Thus it is crucially important that LAC countries should not just passively accept the opportunities arising from location or natural resources, but should actively use the restructuring inevitably connected with a WHFTA to create new dynamic man-made advantages, as Japan and Korea have done. This will require active trade, industrial, educational, training and technology policies with careful selection and concentration on priority sectors. Such policies can and should be markei-frisndly, but they involve more than blind reliance on the market forces of the day.
(b) A Mega-project
The second reason why the ultimate effects of WHFTA are difficult to foresee is that it is a mega-project: economic reasoning and modelling are better adapted to dealing with relatively small marginal changes in circumstances rather than revolutionary upheavals such as WHFTA, given both its large scale and also the fact that it is itself a part of a trade/investment/debt-reduction package (EAI). What we are talking about in the case of WHFTA is not really trade creation, but rather development creation.
(c) Calculating Welfare Effects of WHFTA
The 'welfare-increasing' and 'welfare-reducing' effects of WHFTA must also be carefully defined. The WHFTA could be welfare-reducing for the countries outside but welfare-increasing for the Western Hemisphere. It could be welfare-increasing for some parts of the Hemisphere but welfare-reducing for other parts, welfare-increasing for some sectors but welfare-reducing for others, welfare-increasing for, say, large-scale modem producers within a sector but welfare-reducing for other, say small-scale, producers etc. There will always be gainers and losers. Theoretically the net effect can be measured by compensating the losers (Pareto optimum). But such compensation arrangements are politically difficult to negotiate, and the very compensation process may set welfare-reducing forces in motion.
If the WHFTA becomes a 'fortress' the effects could be welfare-reducing in the long run, even in the absence of retaliation from Europe or Japan. The issue of trade efficiency adds to the difficulties of predicting the impact of WHFTA with any degree of confidence. It means that it is not just a question of analyzing or visualizing the new opportunities which may open up to different LAC countries in the North American market and try to assess their distribution among different LAC countries, it is also a question of the ability of different countries to seize the opportunities opening up to them. The latter is much more difficult to predict than the former. In the past, opportunities for manufactured exports were probably very similar for the East Asian tigers as for Latin America but the former proved to be better at seizing their opportunities (and to some extent pre-empting them).
(3) THE SPECIAL NATURE OF WHFTA (a) Theory and Practice: who benefits from FTAs?
The "genuine partnership" (or "broad-based partnership", as it is described in the letter to Congress introducing the Enterprise for the Americas Act) proclaimed by President Bush cannot of course be a partnership of economic equals. It is an Enterprise for the Americas, not for America! In theory, free trade areas may benefit weaker countries as much or even more than the larger and richer partners ("the small country assumption"). This is supported by advocates of FTAs who put emphasis on the resulting economies of scale, leading to more rapid growth which would be particularly important for the relatively smaller and poorer countries. Poorer countries would tend to benefit as much or even more than the larger and richer partners as production would tend to move from high-cost regions to low-cost regions, contributing to an increase in the amount of capital and an increase in the level of wages in the low-cost regions. This would lead to relatively higher growth of the more backward countries, and thus to a convergence of income levels within the integration scheme.
However, this argument is founded on various simplifying assumptions including perfect competition, full employment, constant returns to scale, and perfect mobility of factors of production, which do not correspond with reality. In order to understand the nature of the problem one has to go beyond such simplifications and observe that there exist a number of factors which are likely to contribute to relatively less rapid growth (or even decline) of relatively poorer countries in an integration arrangement. For example, capital may flow from poorer to richer areas, due to factors such as greater availability of economic infrastructure, access to specialized services, proximity to large markets, greater relative development of capital markets, greater institutional and administrative capability of a region. Also, widening of markets (due to trade liberalization in an integration scheme) will often give competitive advantages to the industries in the more advanced regions. Under these conditions, initial differences in productivity and economic development can lead to "circular and cumulative causation" and thus growing polarization between the different members of an integration scheme; hence the creation and perpetuation of inequalities. That is what Hirschman calls "polarization" and Myrdal the "backwash" effect. The main idea that Myrdal and Hirschman convey is that the play of market forces normally tends to increase rather than decrease inequalities between regions in an integration arrangement. For instance, if a region is not attractive for investment, it will tend to enjoy less technological progress and benefit less from economies of scale than other regions; this in turn will make it even less attractive for foreign investment. Furthermore, in order to take advantage of the positive or "trickle down effects" of the wider market, a poor region must have developed its infrastructure, human capital and administrative and institutional capability to a level which will allow the region to benefit from the effective growth impulses transmitted from other prosperous regions.
Political reality adds another dimension to the issue. Regional arrangements have suffered, and sometimes fallen apart, because of dissatisfaction of weaker partners with a concentration, real or imagined, of the benefits of the integration going disproportionately to the better-off countries. In addition to real economic reasons for this -a better infrastructure of technology, skills, transport and existing industrial structure to take advantage of new trading opportunities and larger markets and withstand intensified competition from abroad -the stronger countries will also be more effective in negotiations to shape the FTA agreement so as to take account of their national interests and also in subsequent dispute settlements. Hence economic gaps or differentials between partners are relevant, in practice and in theory. It has been suggested that the stronger partner will use his superior bargaining strength and negotiating capacity to extract "side payments" on other related matters.^ Latin America was less than one third of that in North America. This is a greater differentia] than that between productivity in Western Europe as against Eastern Europe and the former USSR where the differential is a little over 2:1, but less than the differential between Japan on the one hand and East and South-East Asia on the other hand, which is closer to 4:1 than 3:1. It should be one of the objectives of WHFTA to reduce this 3:1 differential. The discrepancy in per capita income levels is even greater, of the order of 7:1.
The labor productivity differential of Latin America as against the North American level differs sharply between various sectors of manufacturing industry. Based on 1990 data from the UNIDO database, the overall differential is 3.3:1. The sectors which have a markedly more favorable differential -and which therefore should be in a good position to benefit from expanded trade opportunities under the WHFTA -include textiles, leather and fur products, petroleum refineries, miscellaneous petroleum and coal products, rubber products, iron and steel and non-ferrous metal products. By contrast, sectors where Latin American labor productivity is less than one fifth of the North American level include food products, tobacco products, wood and cork products, furniture and fixtures, various non-metallic mineral products, and non-electrical machinery. These are the sectors which prima facie would be expected to be adversely affected by WHFTA. concerned, the importance of the advanced "core" in relation to the "periphery" is greater in the case of the WHFTA than in the two other potential blocs. This means that while the impact of WHFTA on North American employment and the US economy in particular may be small and submerged by other economic trends and events, the impact on the LAC economies would be major and thus has to be carefully analyzed and, as much as possible, anticipated.
(3) Export Coverage
The unequal weight of the partners is also indicated by the fact that for the US the extension to the Free Trade Area from Canada to the rest of the Hemisphere is a relatively small step in terms of export coverage, even including Mexico, from 21.0% by an additional 13.5%; whereas for the LAC countries the extension from Latin American preferences to WHFTA is a very major step -overwhelmingly so for Mexico (from 7.6% by an additional 66.0%) and Venezuela (from 9.0% by an additional 56.6%, but even for Brazil from 12.9% by an additional 28.9%). From the point of view of the US, the big steps in regional integration have already been taken; from the point of view of LAC countries the big steps are still to come.
(c) Country Diversity
Prima facie, one would expect that the impact of WHFTA on individual LAC countries would largely depend on the share of their exports to the US/Canada. This is highest for Mexico (66%), Venezuela (57%) and Ecuador (46%); considerable for Brazil (29%), Colombia (41 %), Peru (32%); but low for Argentina (24%), Bolivia (17%), Chile (19%), Uruguay (12%) and virtually non-existent for Paraguay (4%). However, it would be a very static assumption to make that countries would benefit from WHFTA in the same order. On a different reading, a low share could be taken to indicate the existence of a large unused potential, thus reversing the order of benefit. Exports to non-hemispheric countries are over half of total exports for Argentina (65%), Brazil (58%), Chile (67%), Paraguay (54%) and Uruguay (61 %); under half for Bolivia (25%), Colombia (43%), Ecuador (33%), Mexico (26%), Peru (49%) and Venezuela (34%). These figures would indicate the various degrees by which LAC countries could be affected by any "fortress" developments in WHFTA and possible retaliation by outside countries. However, there seems to be a tendency to sweep this subject under the carpet by tacitly assuming that creation of employment in the South would have no impact on employment in the North. This is not the case. To some extent it is unavoidable that the increased employment and increased exports from the South will be at the expense of unskilled labor in certain industries and regions of the North. While the prospect is that the net effect on employment in the North will be beneficial, both through increased employment in technology-intensive and skill-intensive industries and as a result of a general expansion of trade and rise in incomes, there are bound to be losers among particular categories of workers and in particular industries. This will call for adjustment as well as good social and compensatory policies in the North to avoid popular and congressional hostility to a WHFTA agreement (even though such a protectionist backlash would be the worst possible response). The US Trade Adjustment Act now in place -but under threat of withdrawal -would have to be strengthened and effectively implemented. Such adjustment, often from manufacturing into service industries, on past experience might well result in lower wage scales for some groups of US workers -hence it alone may not be sufficient to eliminate domestic opposition. The question previously raised as to the nature of the connection between membership in WHFTA and adoption of free market policies can be formulated in a sharpened form by asking: will required adjustment policies be modified to allow for regional cooperation and the establishment of WHFTA as an "genuine partnership" (using President Bush's words) or will the WHFTA be constructed in such a way that it becomes an instrument of carrying out and exerting pressure towards specific reform policies? Naturally this is a highly polarized way of putting things -in reality the negotiations will result in compromises and establish a middle ground between these extremes. These negotiations will necessarily extend over a number of years (perhaps on historical precedent five years after the US presidential elections). It should be a task for WHFTA to close, or at least to reduce, the present productivity gap. Higher productivity and expanding employment in Latin America would enhance the importance of Latin American/Carribean domestic markets, and with much of the additional demand directed to non-tradeable or other goods which can be efficiently home-produced, there would be a natural process of efficient import substitution not based on trade obstacles or distorted incentives. When the productivity differential is in fact declining it will then become increasingly safer and more appropriate to engage in further trade liberalization. This has lessons for the sequencing of the various elements of the WHFTA proposal, with trade liberalization complementary to, rather than preceding, a strengthening of the productive base of LAC countries. This is also in line with the relevant development experience of countries like Japan and South Korea.
(3) Need For Infrastructure
As a general rule one may predict that countries with a larger domestic market, with indigenous technological capacity and with a good infrastructure of transport, information etc will be in a better position than countries without these attributes to derive advantage from WHFTA. In practice this means that the more advanced countries are likely to benefit more and become poles de croissance (growth poles) than more backward countries.
The policy conclusion to be drawn is that the poorer countries deserve special consideration and perhaps compensation; and also that the establishment of pre-conditions for seizing opportunities in the poorer countries -infrastructure, technology, information etc -should be assigned a high degree of priority in implementing the WHFTA. Although the resources of the Fund were very small in regard to the ambitious task the MIF was set to perform, still the proposal to create such a Fund in order to help the LAC countries meet the "indicators of readiness" was a significant initiative. The proposal recognized that an inflow of external resources is a necessary complement to internal reforms. In addition, the MIF initiative recognized that swift, successful adjustment in the investment sector in Latin America requires costly, one-time grant financing, to be used to provide cracial technical assistance, to encourage the investment reform process and to ease the burdens of adjustment. which the multilateral development banks (MDBs) are not equipped to provide. However, in April 1992 the US Congress refused to vote US funding for the MIF, which meant that matching funds from Japan and other potential donors would be unavailable'. In the debt arena, the Congress has enacted separate authority which allows the President to reduce the so-called PL-480 programme and USAID debt of least developed countries which are moving toward market -oriented economies. In this direction, and in order to deal with debt issues in LAC countries, the Initiative proposed an Enterprise for the Americas Facility administered by the Treasury department. Debt reduction, investment reform, and environmental protection were all part of the package. The Facility was designed to support debt reduction programmes for countries that meet certain eligibility requirements:
The country should have an IMF standby arrangement, an arrangement under the World Bank structural adjustment facility, or in exceptional circumstances, an IMF-monitored programme or its equivalent.
(ii) The country should be receiving structural or sectoral loans from the World Bank or the International Development Association. The first alternative would cleariy limit the freedom of manoeuvre of LAC countries to formulate their own (and possibly divergent) development strategies concerning the size and role of the public sector, exchange rates, monetary polices, fiscal policies, privatization, food subsidies, intellectual property rights etc, and powerfully reinforce pressures to follow policies of stabilization and adjustment ultimately geared to enable them to service debts within an agreed policy framework. However, against this it should be noted that in President Bush's initial proposal there was a direct link with the debt-reduction programme which would reduce the intensity of the adjustment required and thus make it easier for LAC countries to accept and implement reform programmes.
When the above conditions were met, the US would provide new payment terms for
See Financial Times, 5 June, 1992. Thus, of the three "pillars" of the EAI (trade liberalization, investment restructuring and promotion and debt reduction), only the first remains as envisioned by the initial proposals of the Initiative. Earlier in this paper it was stressed that free trade agreements based on negative integration measures can seldom be equally beneficial between partners with sharply disparate levels of per capita income and social conditions. The necessary "catching up" cannot happen without external resources and support, and without some degree of "catching up" LAC countries will not be able to take full advantage of the benefits of WHFTA and participate in a "genuine partnership" in the Western Hemisphere.
(5) Focus on People
Apart from the impact on the poorer countries, there is the overall effect on poverty to be considered. This is not only a question of distribution of benefits between countries but also of income distribution within countries. According to World Bank estimates, the number of poor people living below the poverty line in Latin America has almost doubled between 1985 and 1989, to over 100 million people, representing almost one quarter of the total population. This increase was both absolutely and relatively higher than in any other part of the world, even including sub-Saharan Africa (although the incidence of poverty at 25 % is less than in Africa or South Asia where it is around 50%). About 70% of Latin America's poor are listed as extremely poor, living below an even lower poverty line; this proportion also is as high as in sub-Saharan Africa and higher than in all other regions. The impact of expanded trade on both the rural and urban poor in Latin America deserves special consideration in any coming negotiations. The analysis of WHFTA should not concentrate solely on technical financial and economic feasibility and consequences, but should include its impact on people. The UNDP with its human resource development experience could offer useful assistance in this direction. At the time of writing, the US has signed bilateral framework agreements with all LAC countries except Haiti, Surinam and Cuba. But the signing of a framework agreement on trade and investment with a LAC country, or a group of countries, does not imply that the US will propose free trade negotiations immediately.
The conditions and modalities of debt
The framework agreements are seen as a mechanism that will enable the US and its prospective partners "to move forward on a step-by-step basis to eliminate counterproductive barriers to trade and investment, and establish a channel to advance the EAI vision"". Prospects for FTA talks depend on progress towards economic reform and political stability. The relationship between WHFTA and existing or prospective regional groupings in Latin America such as ALADI, the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Market, CARICOM, and MERCOSUR, is clearly a complicated one. In practice it will be difficult to avoid a weakening of these regional groupings as a result of WHFTA The US is in principle supporting regional co-operation within Latin America, as indicated in the statement by President Bush mentioning the possibility of entering into free trade agreements "with groups of countries". This means that everybody wants to avoid a situation where existing regional groupings are bypassed or even disrupted through competition among individual member countries to enter into direct negotiations on WHFTA and compete for access to the US market and the associated investment and debt packages. There is also a danger that any such bypassing of existing regional groupings in favor of direct negotiations may conflict with the provision common to all existing groupings prohibiting such bilateral treaties and providing that any tariff preference with a non-LAC country (which would include the US and Canada) must automatically be fully extended to the other members of the regional grouping. The most realistic proposal in the circumstances seems to be that arrived at by SELA'"*. This suggests that the regional groupings should first define a common position concerning the "criteria, rules of the game and issues to be considered" -perhaps leading to a common LAC joint position, while leaving the detailed negotiations and conclusion of actual agreements to individual countries or perhaps sub-regional groupings. This is a suggestion to be carefully considered although the distinction between "rules of the game" and an agenda for the negotiations on the one hand and the actual negotiations on the other hand may not be easy to maintain in the actual unfolding of eventsat least this is what experience with the Uruguay Round and other GATT negotiations seems to suggest.
The negotiations for a WHFTA -as already pointed out -will be complicated and time-consuming whether the regional groupings are involved, or whether the negotiations are on a country-by-country basis. This also raises the problem and danger of an unequal partnership. 
